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NEW FACETS RELATING TO INTERSTATE
PROBLEMS IN SALES TAX
ADMINISTRATION 1
For some years problems relating to the impact of the
commerce clause upon the jurisdiction of the several states
to tax has been the sand in the state attorney-general's spinach. Within the past months there has been welcome vigor
and courage in the opinions of the Supreme Court touching
this field of constitutional law. Perhaps it is not too much
to say that a new era is at hand, an era in which the law is
regarded as an organic, growing institution moulded by, and not shaping - the social emergencies of the moment.
An era of which the hall mark will be the adjustment of law
to life.
Some court decisions attract attention because they reflect
anew or with greater candor rules which are time-honored
and hoary with precedent. Others are important because they
lead to a re-examination of the validity for our time of what
parades as justice or truth.
The significance of the recent McGoldrick v. BerwindWhite Coal Mining Company 2 decision, is that it belongs to
the latter class. It affords fresh insight, challenges conventional assumptions which had led to ridiculous results, and
provides an epitaph to an era of doctrinal pronouncement
which had disregarded economic consequences. This decision
impels a re-examination of state taxing power as affected by
the commerce clause. In conjunction with an earlier decision
from the pen of the same Justice, i. e.: that of Western Live
Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,3 it is the most provocative
stimulus to thinking on state jurisdiction to tax commerce
that has appeared in the past decade.
I An address before the Annual Conference of the National Association of
Attorneys General, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. September 10, 1940, given in
connection with the annual meeting of the American Bar Association.
2 309 U. S. 33, 84 L. Ed. 343, 60 Sup. Ct. 388 (1940).
3 303 U. S. 250 (1938).
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The Scope of This Discussion
Before venturing into the possibilities of the court's new
course of deciding tax problems by the beacon of practicalities rather than by the tallow of technical legal lineage, it is
of consequence to define the boundaries of this discussion.
The term "sales tax" here used comprehends: first, all sales
taxes, whether imposed upon the vendor or vendee, and
whether measured by the price charged or by quantity;
second, all gross income or gross receipts taxes insofar as the
origin of the measure of such taxes are sales; and, third, use
taxes. No distinction will be recognized if turning on the
mere mechanics of collection: i. e., whether the tax is calculated on each sale as it occurs, or by periodic totals, for
this cannot be of substantial importance insofar as the constitutional question is concerned.
Problems To Be Canvassed
In the interest of clarity, let the particular problems to be
.dealt with be stated as being:
1. Is the rule announced likely to be made available only
where the taxing state "imposes" the tax on the purchaser?
2. Must both the order for the goods and the delivery occur within the taxing jurisdiction to which the purchaser is subject?
3.

What rule may be expected with reference to sales
where the goods are imported to the taxing state for
the purpose of later transporting them to another
state for resale?

4.

May the producing state or state of origin of the goods
sold expect to benefit by the relocation of the boundaries of permissible taxation?

5.

Must the use tax always be complementary to a sales
tax?
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Confusion Priorto Recent Rulings
In the decade immediately preceding the recent New York
City sales tax decisions, tax administrators characterized the
state of the law of taxation of interstate commerce as "all sail
and no anchor." There were pronouncements that interstate
commerce might not be taxed at all. At the same time, an
erosion of this rule was apparent in statements that the
states might tax as long as they did not tax commerce "as
such." Distinctions between impositions were made to appear to rest upon whether the burden was "direct" or "indirect," - the difference being much more formal than real.
Frequently, also, the court seems to have used the terms
"direct" and "indirect" to announce the conclusion intended
to be reached, rather than to use those terms as defined
criteria to discover the conclusion. Decisions thus became
sleight-of-tongue performances. The statements of the court
did not provide a canon of their application, which is another
way of saying that in a workaday world they were as futile
as a brand new guest towel.
True, Professor Thomas Reed Powell had, by disregarding formulae and considering only results, been able to present in economic terms a standard based on the results of the
decisions. But the statements of the court itself were such
as to indicate that the court was not committed to adopting
this standard - and, in fact, it was not adopted during those
years.
The states, then, were the "little neutrals" of the commerce clause.
The New York City Tax Cases
On January 29, 1940, Mr. Justice Stone read the prevailing opinion in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Company, while Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered a dissent in which two colleagues concurred. Upheld was a sales tax
imposed by a city in the state of delivery with reference to
personal property shipped from another state to consummate
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a sales contract entered into prior to the commencement of
the transportation. The seller maintained within New York
City sales offices at which the orders for the coal were received. The coal was then mined in Pennsylvania, shipped
and delivered in the seller's barges to the purchaser at water's
edge in New York City. Under the old dispensation here was
a factual situation which would have resulted in a prohibited
tax. Consequently, the decision was the first in which the
canons of practicability, referred to by Mr. Justice Stone in
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, came into full
flower.
Because the leading decision excites, two companion cases
decided upon the same day have suffered some obscurity.
In McGoldrick v. Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co.,4 orders for
comptometers were solicited in New York City and, upon
approval at the principal office in Chicago, Illinois, the machines were shipped, invoiced to the purchaser, to the seller's
New York City agent who delivered them to the purchaser
after inspection and adjustment. The New York City sales
tax was upheld with reference to such transactions.
In McGoldrick v. A. H. DuGrenier, Inc.,5 an exclusive
sales agent solicited orders in New York City for vending
machines manufactured by a Massachusetts vendor. The
seller, upon approval of the orders, sent the machines by
common carrier direct to the buyer in New York City, the
purchaser paying the freight. The New York City sales tax
was upheld upon this transaction.
These determinations turn upon the multiple-tax doctrine,
which, in effect, permits the state of delivery to impose the
tax rather than the sending states, because in this way the
tax burden is certain to be equal to, but no greater than, that
borne by domestic commerce. For if both the sending and
receiving state were to tax the same sale, there is one more
4

5

309 U. S. 70, 84 L. Ed. 584, 60 Sup. Ct. 404 (1940).
Op. Cit. Supra, note 4.
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tax on such a sale than on a sale not straddling a state line.
This rule was announced in Western Live Stock v. Bureau
of Revenue in the following language:
"The vice characteristic of those which have been held invalid" (referring to taxes which burden commerce between the states) "is that
they have placed on the commerce burdens of such nature as to be
capable, in point of substance, of being imposed ... or added to... with

equal right by every state which the commerce touches, merely because
interstate commerce is being done, so that without the protection of
the commerce clause it would bear cumulative burdens not imposed on
local commerce."

The freedom of a multi-state sale from a sales tax imposed by the exporting state is an essential premise of the
majority's syllogism. It avoids the vice of cumulative tax
burdens which would result merely because of the interstate
character of the transaction. It also implements Mr. Justice
Stone's declaration that there is no substantial reason in the
distinction between an order for goods which have crossed
state lines to seek a market prior to the receipt of the order, - and an order which precedes the interstate shipment.
The majority opinion states:
"But we think that this discrimination is without the support of
reason or authority. A very large part, if not most of the merchandise
sold in New York City, is shipped interstate to that market. In the case
of products like cotton, citrus fruits, and coal, not to mention many
others which are consumed there in vast quantities, all have crossed
the state line to seek a market, whether in the fulfillment of a contract
or not. That is equally the case with other goods sent from without the
state to the New York market, whether they are brought into competition with like goods produced within the state or not. We are unable
to say that the present tax, laid generally upon all sales to consumers
within the state, subjects the commerce involved where the goods sold
are brought from other states, to any greater burden or affects it any
more, in any economic or practical way, whether the purchase order or
contract precedes or follows the interstate shipment. Since the tax applies only if a sale is made, and in either case the object of interstate
shipment is a sale at destination, the deterrent effect of the tax would
seem to be the same on both. Restriction of the scope of the commerce
clause so as to prevent recourse to it as a means of curtailing state
power seems as salutary in the one case as in the other."
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That this premise that the state of origin, or the state of
intermediate transportation cannot impose a sales tax on interstate transactions is presently unassailable, seems quite
clear from the decisions in Adams Manufacturing Company
v. Storen,6 and Gwin, White and Prince v. Henneford.7
Strangely enough, it is the minority, composed of Mr. Justice Roberts, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, and Mr. Justice McReynolds, which insists that there is a danger in adopting
the prevailing rule (that the state of destination may impose a sales tax) because of the peril that the state of shipment or of intermediate passage in transport may levy similar excises. The term "strangely" is used because the
record clearly indicates that the dissenters would not permit
such states to do so. Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the Adams
ManufacturingCompany v. Storen decision, and the decisions
barring the possibility now invoked as a bogy are cited by
the minority as reasons why the state of destination should
be likewise bridled. Certainly, the dissenters in the BerwindWhite case apparently are more concerned about characterizations than about practical results. In the words of a popular song they say: "It aint what you do, it's the way that
you do it."
Problem One:
Is "Imposition" the Magic Word?
Since the announcement of the Berwind-White decision,
some have attempted to minimize its effect by asserting that
the rule announced is only applicable where the taxing enactment formally "imposes" the tax upon the purchaser. A
provision of the New York City taxing ordinance directing
that the tax
"shall be paid by the purchaser to the vendor, for and on account of
the City of New York"
6 304 U. S. 307 (1938).
7

305 U. S. 434, 83 L. Ed. 272, 59 Sup. Ct. 325 (1939).
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lends some color to the hypothesis that sales taxes or gross
receipts taxes formally levied upon the vendor would not
participate in the enlightened attitude which blacks out the
former discrimination in favor of interstate commerce. The
recent decision affirming the power of a state to tax the
transaction of renting safe deposit boxes, despite the fact
that the lessor was a national bank, will probably be cited
in support of this restrictive hypothesis since there the court
mentioned that the tax was formally "imposed" upon the
lessee.' What is overlooked by those making such a suggestion is this: The reason for the rule in the Bedford case is
that is is not enough that the tax was non-discriminatory. National banks as such may be taxed by the states only in the
manner that Congress prescribes (R. S. 5219), whereas in
the Berwind-White case a non-discriminatory tax on interstate commerce was upheld. Thus in the Bedford case, because an entirely different rule was applicable, it was necessary to show that the tax was not on the bank. In addition,
it should be noted that both the economic thrust and the
technical requirement with reference to the imposition of
the tax led to the result reached.
It would appear that such attempts to limit the BerindWhite rule are destined for disappointment. Practicality is
the essence of both the pronouncement and the results
achieved in the Berwind-White case. The strength of the
analogy in economic impact between the New York City
sales tax and the use taxes which the court has hitherto held
valid indicates clearly that out-of-pocket realities rather
than form are the controlling factors. In the use tax cases
the vendor is responsible for the collection of the tax, so that
as far as actual results are concerned, there is no substantial
difference between these excises. The effect upon commerce
is identical in both cases. The minority who dissented in the
Berwind-White case, thereby objecting to the imposition of
8 Colorado National Bank v. Bedford, 310 U. S. 41, 84 L. Ed. 1067, 60 Sup.
Ct. 800 (1940).
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the sales tax, had previously approved of the incidence of the
use tax. Had a substantial economic difference existed between the results of a sales tax and use tax, the minority
would have demonstrated it. Significantly, they did not attempt such a task. The rule permitting the state of entrance
to impose a sales tax is not likely to be restricted to statutes
which name the purchaser as the person from whom the tax
is to be collected.
Problem Two:
Must Both the Order and Delivery Occur Within State?
In the Berwind-White case the receipt of the order, its
acceptance, and the delivery of the thing sold, all occurred
within the taxing jurisdiction. Since many other states having sales taxes are geographically situated so that many
sales occur where only the delivery takes place within the
taxing jurisdiction, the question has been presented whether
such delivery affords sufficient bases to tax.
The Berwind-White decision does not go that far. But
from its companion cases of McGoldrick v. Felt and Tarrant
Manufacturing Company and McGoldrick v. A. H. Du Gren-

ier, Inc., we can deduce that the place at which the contract
is approved or made was considered by the court as being
immaterial. In the Felt and Tarrant case the contract was
approved in Illinois, while in the Du Grenier case the sales
contract was approved in Massachusetts. From a legal standpoint, such sales contracts are considered as being made respectively in Illinois and Massachusetts.
From a practical standpoint, the place of making the
agreement of sale is unimportant. There is no greater danger of pyramiding tax burdens where the approval of the
order is an extrastate activity, than where approval to sales
is indicated locally. No cumulative tax burden will result
where only the delivery occurs within the taxing jurisdiction,
so that it seems safe to predict that sales taxes in states of
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entrance will be sustained regardless of the locale chosen at
which to make the agreement of sale.
Since the Berwind-White decision was .announced, some
states have promulgated new regulations; i. e., Illinois, Virginia, Washington, Utah, and Kansas. Newspapers have characterized the tax imposed under such broadened regulations
as a "delivery tax." Whether this is so is a debatable question. Those who are of the "delivery-is-the-only-essential"
school rely upon a statement of the majority describing the
tax:
"It is conditioned upon events occurring within the state, either
transfer of title OR possession of the purchased property, or an agreement within the state, 'consummated' there, for the transfer of title, or
possession."

and also upon the characterization by the dissent of the tax
as one on delivery:
"It is urged that there is a taxable event within the state. That event
is said to be the delivery of the coal."
"If because of the delivery in New York that State can tax the gross
receipts from the sale..."

They also point to the result in Jagels "A" Fuel Corporation
v. Taylor,9 and to the fact that no discrimination results from
such tax, but that realities and practical consequences are its
only fruits. The sales about which the controversy arose and
upon which the tax had been assessed fell within three
classes: In the first were orders received by telephone at the
petitioner's New York office, which the petitioner telephoned
to its New Jersey office, where, upon credit approval, the order was accepted, and delivery was made to the consumer
in New York from a New Jersey coal yard. In the second class
the order was telephoned direct to New Jersey by the customer, followed by a confirmatory written order, and delivery was made from the New Jersey yard to the customer in
New York. In the third class, a written order was sent by
the purchaser in New York to the New Jersey office, and de9 60 Sup. Ct. 469 (1940).
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livery was made from the New Jersey yard to the customer
in New York. In all three classes the customer was billed
from the New Jersey office and payment was made to that
office. The important thing about the Iagels case is that the
tax was sustained with reference to all three classes of sales.
It should be noted that in the third class the sale.was not
made through the resident office at all, but resulted from a
mail order.
Those who believe that some local activity in addition to
mere delivery must exist before the state of destination may
tax, point out that the statements of the Berwind-White
majority quoted above undergo in the opinion a process of
evolution. For later the court says:
"It (the tax) is laid upon every purchaser, within the state, of goods
for consumption ...

Still further on:
"Here the tax is conditioned upon a local activity delivery Df goods
within the state upon theirpurchase for consumption."

And in the Felt and Tarrantand Du Greniercases:
"In both cases the tax was imposed on all the sales of merchandise
for which orders were taken within the city and possession of which was
transferred to the purchaser there."

Whether delivery alone is sufficient as a peg upon which
to sustain a tax presents jurisdictional problems- and will
call for a determination under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. The problem has recently been
considered by the Supreme Court of Iowa which in two decisions,'" held the provisions of the Iowa Use Tax requiring
out-of-state mail order houses to collect the tax from purchasers to be unconstitutional as applied to mail order sales
requiring delivery into Iowa. The prevailing opinion cites
and discusses the Berwind-White decision, pointing out that
there:
10 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Roddewig, 292 N. W. 130 (Iowa, 1940); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Roddewig, 292.N. W. 142 (Iowa, 1940).
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"The products were sold and delivered in that city. The tax pertained to activities within the jurisdiction of the taxing body."

There is a possibility that Congressional action may render any judicial determination moot, for a bill has been introduced in Congress 11 to permit non-discriminatory state
taxation of solicitors and mail order houses who ship goods
into the state of ultimate use or consumption.
The Supreme Court left open the question of the effect of
f. o. b. deliveries outside the city in the New York City sales
tax cases. However, in United Autographic Register Co. v.
McGoldrick, 2 decided June 28, 1940, the Court ruled that
the city sales tax applied to such transactions. The orders
were taken by salesmen operating from the taxpayer's sales
office in New York City and were confirmed in Chicago. The
goods were then shipped f. o. b. factory and the freight was
charged to the customer. Noteworthy is the fact that, in
holding delivery from outside the city was only a matter of
convenience, the court pointed out that similar goods could
be made in New York, while in the Berwind-White case this
rule of availability was not discussed.
Problem Three:
Goods From Another State Destined for a Third State
and Resale.
The New York City sales tax was limited to sales for local
use or consumption. Therefore, by no stretch of the imagination could it be argued that the city was taking toll from other states. At the present time most state sales taxing statutes
exempt sales for resale. But should a state impose a tax upon
the introduction of goods from sister states in such a way
as to tax that which comes in to go out again for resale, it
would seem that the criterion against cumulative tax burdens would be impinged upon and the tax would fail.
11

H. R. 9045.

12

21 N. Y. S. 2d 129 (1940).
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In J. Bacon and Sons v. Martin,"
imposing a tax
"On the receipt of cosmetics in the State by any Kentucky retailer
equal to twenty per cent of the invoice price plus transportation cost,
if any, to the Kentucky dealer." 14

was upheld in an unanimous per curiam opinion. It does not
appear that a provision to avoid the imposition of the tax
where the goods might be sent into a third state was contained in the Kentucky statute. But since the tax case was
confined to retailers "selling personal property not intended
for resale," the Act clearly did not intend to reach sales
where delivery is to be made into other states. Undoubtedly,
the act will be so construed as to limit it to Kentucky deliveries.
Problem Four:
And What of States of Origin?
Recent commentators have suggested that there is a hint,
negatively presented, that the court may re-examine its holding in Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen, 5 and
Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford,'6 resulting in a corresponding relocation of lines of permissible taxation. The
Adams case is authority forthe proposition that the state of
exit is not permitted to impose a tax measured by gross receipts for the reason that such an imposition would probably
result in a pyramiding of taxes where the state of entrance
employed the use tax.
Those who professed to see signs of a changing attitude
on the part of the court, due to new personnel, point out that
the Storen case expressly recognizes that, had the taxable
event been said to be the privilege of manufacturing,' 7 or

15

305 U. S. 380, 83 L. Ed. 233, 59 Sup. Ct. 257 (1939).
Carroll, Ky. STAT. ANx. §§ 4281d (1-25).
304 U. S. 307 (1938).

16

305 U. S. 434, 83 L. Ed. 272, 59 Sup.

's
14

Ct. 325

(1939).

American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459 (1919), Utah Power and
Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932).
17
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upon extraction, 8 or severance, 9 the tax would have been
held not to impinge the commerce clause. This school argues
that such an attitude represents formalism in its most advanced stage, since it makes the validity of the imposition
depend upon mere words; i. e., the name given the tax by the
legislature. They argue that the economic impact is .precisely the same whether the out-of-pocket exaction is called a
gross receipts tax or whether it is a tax on manufacturing
measured by the identical gross receipts.
In view of the majority opinions in recent cases, it is extremely difficult to find any substantial bases for believing
that the Storen ruling will be reversed at an early date. The
absence of a tax by the state of shipment is a premise essential to Mr. Justice Stone's conclusions. With the law in its
present state, then, there is no reason to suppose that the
producing state, or the state from which goods are shipped,
may expect to benefit by the relocation of the boundaries of
permissible taxation under the commerce clause. So far we
have been referring to the majority holding in the Storen and
Berwind-White cases insofar as all of the gross income is
concerned, but those cases and the cases subsequent have indicated that if the gross income was allocated to the state of
destination and the state of origin, the tax would be sustained.
Problem Five:
Must Use Taxes Always Complement Sales Taxes?
The day when the interrelation of use to sales taxes was
deemed necessary may now be past. In fact, there appears
to be a definite advantage in the abandonment of sales taxes
and a reliance upon general use taxes. By that is meant a
general use tax imposed upon the receipt by exchange or pur18 Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas
Colliery Co., 206 U. S. 245 (1922); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284

(1927).
19 Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U. S. 545 (1924).
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chase of any tangible personal property for use, storage, or
consumption, - in other words, on all property so received except for the purpose of resale. Vendors may be made responsible for the collection of the use tax, and vendees charged
with the affirmative duty to pay when the vendor fails to do
so. Such a use tax does not impinge upon the commerce
clause. Divorced from the consideration of a corollary tax,
it treats all use alike regardless of antecedents. The advantage would be in escaping the reserved and open question
2 ° namely:
referred to in Southern Pacific v. Gallagher,
Whether a use tax which permits the deduction of local sales
taxes must grant the same credit for such taxes when imposed by sister states of exit. Frankly, it would seem that no
such deduction should be required. But undoubtedly the peril
may be avoided since a state utilizing a use tax exclusively
would not be faced with the necessity of providing for any
deduction for any other tax whatsoever, - and thus even
the appearance of a technical discrimination against commerce between the states can be obviated.
The Globe-Varnish and Wood Preserving Cases:
The concept of interstate commerce received elaborate discussion in three sales tax case opinions handed down by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the first
opinions from the higher federal courts on this question since
the Berwind-White case.
In Matter of Globe Varnish Co., decided July 23, the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax-as applied to a sale of goods
to a railroad was declared to be forbidden by the commerce
clause of the constitution.
The goods were consigned to the road's shops in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and it received them aboard its cars in
Chicago. The Illinois Department of Finance assessed the
tax against the seller on the theory that delivery had been
20

306 U. S. 167, 172 (1939).
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made to the buyer within the state, and that the transaction
was then and there complete for purposes of taxation. The
court, however, held that the railroad took possession of the
goods in its capacity as carrier (though it was also the buyer)
and was bound to transport them to the consignment point.
Since the railroad had this dual buyer-carrier status, the
transaction must be treated, the court said, just as if the
seller had placed goods aboard a carrier for shipment to a
buyer located outside the state.
One member of the three-judge court, in a dissent, agreed
with the Illinois authorities on the ground that the railroad
received title and possession to the property in Illinois and
that the sale was therefore to be treated as any other local
transaction.
In Wood Preserving Corp. v. Department of Treasury, the
same court, in a similarly divided opinion, held that the
Indiana gross income tax could not be applied to receipts
from a transaction in which a Pennsylvania corporation sold
ties to a railroad, delivering them to the road in Indiana for
transportation to the road's maintenance department in another state. In addition to holding that this was an attempt
to impose a discriminatory tax on interstate commerce, the
court also said that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited the tax. It based its holding to that
effect, first, on its construction of the Indiana Gross Income
Tax statute, that the taxable event was the receipt of income, and that this event did not take place in Indiana. Second, conceding for purposes of argument that the taxable
event was the transaction in Indiana, many of the component
parts of this whole transaction took place outside Indiana,
and, therefore the income derived from a particular sale of
ties could not be taxed without apportionment on the basis
of business activity taking place within and without the state.
In both of these appeals fhe taxpayer relied upon language
contained in the decision of Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v.
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Bondurant,2 ' and insisted that the fact that the purchaser
"contemplated" or had an "intention" to transport the
goods after it had acquired them is sufficient to remove the
transaction from the realm of permissible state taxation under the commerce clause.
It should be noted that not only was there an absence of
the requirement to transport the goods sold across state lines
as a part of the sales contract, but in both instances the railroad was anxious that the goods should not be so transported.
Both state taxing authorities have pointed out that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Sonneborn Brothers v.
Cureton,22 discussed the Dahnke-Walker case, saying:
"But that case was not concerned with the power to tax, but rather
the power of a state to prevent an engagement in interstate commerce
within her limits, except by her leave."

The point is also made that the Globe Varnish Company
and the Wood Preserving Corporationwere not engaged in
interstate commerce, although in transporting the goods acquired the railroads undoutedly were. In United States v.
Rutherland,23 we find the following language:
"The transaction is completed when the sale is made. What the
purchaser does with the thing bought certainly can not affect the nature
of the transaction between him and the seller. The purchaser indeed
is engaged in interstate commerce if he transports the thing bought to

another state, but the seller is not."

The Globe Varnish and Wood Preserving cases do not
seem to be cases dealing with the power of the states to impose a tax having an incidental effect upon interstate commerce. The question in these appeals is: Was the transaction,
insofar as the taxpayer is concerned, one in commerce between the states?
21 257 U. S. 282 (1921).
22

262 U. S. 506 (1922).

23

9 Fed. Supp. 204, 207 (1934).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

State Board of Equalization v. Blind Bull Coal Company:2 4
The Wyoming sales tax must be paid on sales of coal made
at the mines in Wyoming to purchasers who transport the
coal into other states for use or consumption after buying
it and taking delivery in Wyoming. The Supreme Court of
Wyoming, on April 16, 1940, held that the tax was imposed
on a local transaction which was entirely completed when
delivery was taken within the state, and that therefore there
was no constitutional objection to a state tax on such a sale.
The opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court cannot be
harmonized with the recent decision of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Wood
Preserving Corporation v. Depazrtment of Treasury. Since
the Wood Preserving and Globe Varnish cases are both
destined for appeal to the United States Supreme Court, we
may confidently expect an authoritative adjudication of this
precise point within the next five or six months.
The Ingram-RichardsonCase:
Another case the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
decided on the same day as the Globe-Varnish and Wood
Preserving cases is the appeal in Ingram-RichardsonManufacturingCo. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana.Involved
was the question whether one who performs a service in
processing personal property belonging to an out-of-state customer is engaged in interstate commerce, and whether the
gross receipts derived from such processing may be used as
a measure of a tax. The taxpayer enameled metal parts belonging to out-of-state stove and refrigerator manufacturers.
The enameling process itself was completely performed within the taxing state. But the taxpayer sent its trucks into
other states to bring the metal parts to its enameling plant,
and after enameling, returned them to their owners in the
same trucks. The gross receipts forming the subject-matter
24

101 P. 2d 70 (Wyo., 1940).
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of the litigation were "for enamelling," and the taxpayer's
brief insists that "... . if the receipts were from services,...

they are nevertheless from interstate commerce."
The court, regarding the income thus received as for more
than merely the processing services rendered at the processing plant, held the tax invalid under the commerce clause,
basing its ruling on Gwin, White and Price v. Henneford.
NA TA Committee Suggests Uniform Regulation:
As a result of the Graybar, the Berwind-White, and the
lagel cases, a committee appointed by the National Association of Tax Administrators has recently- recommended a
regulation which provides that a sale is taxable if delivery
occurs in the state and if the seller is engaged in business
in the state, even though the sale is not routed through the
seller's in-state representative, but is mailed, telephoned, or
telegraphed to the seller to the seller's office outside of the
buyer's state. The term, "engaged in business," is defined by
the regulation to include operating a sales office, warehouse,
or having a salesman or solicitor operating within the buyer's
state. The regulation further provides that when goods are
sold and the seller is obliged to deliver them outside the
state, the sales tax imposed by the seller's state does not
apply. However, if the purchaser takes delivery within the
state and subsequently transports the goods outside of the
state, the state in which the sale and delivery were consummated is empowered to impose the tax.
Sears-Roebuck and Company v. Roddewig:
A sharply divided Iowa Supreme Court held unconstitutional the provisions of the Iowa Use Tax Act requiring mail
order houses to collect the tax at the source, in the case of
Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Roddewig, decided May 14. The
statute provides that retailers maintaining a place of business
and making sales of property for use within the state must
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collect the tax from the purchaser at the time of making such
sales whether the seller is thysically within or without the
state. The mail order house, a foreign corporation, operated
through local retail outlets and also made sales to persons in
Iowa by mail from out-of-state branches. The state sought
to require collection of the use tax on the latter type of sale
under penalty of revocation of the certificate of the local retail outlet to do business in the state.
The majority opinion regarded this action as an attempt
to regulate activities taking place outside the state since the
sales were made outside the state and the statute required
collection of the tax at the time sales were made. The cancellation of the retailer's permit would thus be based on
failure to pay a debt arising from a regulation of activities
outside the state.
The dissenting opinion stressed the activities in Iowa
which took place even in connection with mail order sales:
The solicitation through large and small catalogues and special sales bulletins by means of which the company made
1,200,000 sales to Iowa residents in 1937. It then pointed out
that the use tax was imposed on the use of goods in the state
and, as a condition of granting to the company the privilege
of doing business in Iowa, the state could compel the company to collect this tax from purchasers of goods.
On the same day in Montgomery Ward and Co. v. Roddewig the court unanimously held that the state could not compel similar retail outlets located in various towns just over
the Iowa border in Missouri, South Dakota, Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska to collect the use tax on sales made
over the counter to Iowa residents. Here the court felt an
almost impossible burden would be put on the stores in trying to ascertain where the buyers lived or intended to use
the property.
The State of Iowa has asked the United States Supreme
Court to review the decisions handed down by the Iowa Su-
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preme Court, petitions for certiorari having been filed July
18, 1940. Incidentally, the same questions and the same taxpayers are involved in litigation pending in Utah, which is
to be tried at a very early date.
The FarHorizon
The recent developments, beginning with Gregg Dyeing
Co. v. Query,25 continuing through Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, supra, Graybar Electric Co. v. Curry,2 6
and the McGoldrick New York City Sales Tax cases, represent a definite and commendable progress in achieving
more practical results with reference to state taxation and
the commerce clause. Eventually, the courts may recognize
that use and sales excises (though not of the genus of property taxes) should be allowed to disregard antecedent taxation in other states to the same extent and in the same manner that our conventional property taxes now do. This
eventually, however, is for the far horizon.
In Conclusion
For a number of years past, Professor Thomas Reed Powell has been levelling law review articles at the United States
Supreme Court calling for a remolding of the canons growing out of the commerce clause and applicable to constitutional restraints and state taxation. Tempering his surveys
with the sinister weapon of tact, it seems that in effect he
paraphrased four lines of Lewis Carroll:
"You are old, Father William," the young man said,
"And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your head, -

Do you think, in our age, * it is right?"
By standing "on its head" allusion was made to the Court's
tendency to decide state tax questions having a relationship
to interstate commerce upon heady abstractions, or by phil25
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286 U. S.472 (1932).
308 U. S. 513, 84 L. Ed. 437, 60 Sup. Ct. 139 (1939).
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osophical rather than practical bases. Magic words, such as
"direct," "indirect," or "on commerce," and technical incantations evidently satisfied abstract logical requirements
while in many instances running counter to realities as certainly as did the crowded events of "Alice in Wonderland."
The suggestion made was that the Court "keep its feet upon
the ground" for the purpose of viewing the problem from the
point of view of men in the practical business of paying or
collecting taxes.
The Court has recently done this. In the Western Live
Stock and Berwind-White cases, the majority seem resolved
to:
"Take care of the sense
and the sounds will take care of themselves."

Joseph P. McNamara.

Indianapolis, Indiana.

